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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the role of venture capital in regional economic development and
presents results from a national survey of venture capital firms concerning the existence of
capital gaps in the venture capital markets. In order to explore these issues, the author lays
out the theoretical underpinnings of venture capital-oriented indigenous growth strategies
and assesses the relationship of such strategies to small-firm employment arguments. The
author provides further context by discussing the institutional boundaries of the venture
capital industry. Analysis of the survey results offers evidence concerning the nature of
venture capital gaps.
The author argues that venture capital is a critical component of innovation-based
localization economies. As such, it enables high factor-cost regions to remain competitive
by counteracting the negative effects of the product/profit life cycle. However, the
venture capital industry's size, cyclicality, and import-export characteristics place bounds
on the industry's possibilities with regard to regional economic development. Changes in
the industry's fund sources provide a plausible explanation for the existence of capital
gaps in the face of booming investment. The author finds evidence that capital gaps exist
by investment stage and size. Industry and regional gaps are found to be probable as well.
The author concludes by recommending that policymakers resolve impediments to venture
capital financing through small-scale interventions and countercyclical public sector
investment.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The rhetoric and role models of economic development in the United States have
changed drastically over the past two decades. Cities and regions that once sought
growth from large corporate headquarters and the attraction of manufacturing branch
plants now tout the dynamic potential of growth through entrepreneurial innovation (Teitz
1994). Although cities and regions continue to compete with one another through
industrial tax abatements and other capital attraction strategies, a growing recognition
exists that such efforts constitute a zero-sum game in which economic development gains
are often fleeting. Many cities and regions have thus shifted their economic development
focus from policies designed to capture growth from outside the region to policies
designed to cultivate the conditions that lead to growth from within the region (Isserman
1994). Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128 are held up as the archetypes of this new
economic development ideal.'
The new models of locally generated growth-which I shall refer to as indigenous
growth models-have many components. They involve small firms, technology
development, research partnerships, financing infrastructure, and extensive networking
among their many actors. Business incubators and "hot" industries that often have few
roots in the local economy also figure prominently in the new roadmaps for economic
development. Startup firms are the centerpieces of these new economic visions. Both
government and private actors (foundations, nonprofits, business organizations) have
taken part in the attempt to spur indigenous entrepreneurial growth (Eisinger 1988).
The reasons behind the appeal and subsequent adoption of these models are not
hard to see. The flight of large-scale manufacturers and the high-wage jobs they provided
from the urban areas of the Midwest and Northeast is well known. High labor and land
costs, as well as stable or negative population growth, have made the attraction of large
branch plants in mature industries an outmoded strategy for these regions. The creation of
1 For a comparison of Silicon Valley and Route 128, see Saxenian (1994).
innovative new firms with high growth potential and export markets is thus seen not
merely as a strategy for regional improvement, but as a necessity for regional survival.
Regions outside the Northeast and Midwest are turning to indigenous growth models as
well. As their economies mature and as commodity manufacturing becomes even more
globalized, cities in the Southeast and Southwest are experimenting with technology
transfer arrangements and other promotional measures for startup firms.
One of the institutional cornerstones of the indigenous growth models is the
venture capital industry. The innovative new firms whose generation is sought are high-
risk/high-reward undertakings ill-suited to traditional debt financing. Venture capital
firms, by providing equity for the development of new businesses or the rapid expansion of
existing ones, enable the transformation of new concepts and technologies into
commercial job-generating enterprises. Business leaders, planners, government officials,
and community members are all concerned with the timely provision of adequate equity
capital for their region's indigenous business growth opportunities. They all wish to ensure
that windows of opportunity are not lost in the fast-moving world of national and global
markets. Planners and other officials have taken a particular interest in venture capital as
it is one of the key variables (along with funding for local research institutions) on which
policy-makers can have an influence. At the national level, the federal government has
long subsidized the provision of venture capital through the Small Business Investment
Corporation (SBIC) program. Over the past decade, as the venture capital industry has
expanded and as regions have taken note of the tremendous entrepreneurial growth in
areas such as Silicon Valley, many regions have begun to view the promotion of the local
venture capital industry as a means of stimulating the new firm births and technological
development that are central to the indigenous growth models. As of 1997, at least 43
states had some form of state-subsidized venture capital (Lerner 1997).
Despite the current popularity of venture capital-oriented strategies, a key question
remains: Does a problem exist that the increased provision of venture capital can solve?
Another way of phrasing this question is, do capital gaps exist? A venture capital gap is a
disjunction between the supply of venture capital and the demand for this capital. In order
for economic development policy interventions that involve venture capital to have a
positive effect, some impediment to venture financing must exist. If all firms that could
productively employ equity investments have adequate access to the venture capital
markets, then planners and policymakers should turn their attention elsewhere. The
justification for venture capital-oriented development strategies thus depends upon the
existence of capital gaps. Two forms of capital gaps are possible. The first is a private, or
market, gap. In this type of gap, capital does not flow to businesses offering the highest
risk-adjusted rate of return due to structural imperfections in the venture capital industry.
The second type of gap is a public, or development, gap. In this type of gap, insufficient
venture capital flows to viable firms that have attractive social returns but below-market
risk-adjusted private returns. Such social returns include job creation, stimulation of
economic activity in economically depressed areas, and provision of business opportunities
to disadvantaged populations. I will argue that both types of gaps are likely to exist in the
venture capital markets.
These venture capital gaps have important implications. If the disbursement of
venture capital is uneven, inconsistent, or otherwise lacking with regard to desirable
investments in particular firm types, industries, or regions, then the regional economies
that are affected may not be living up to their potential. Such regions may either grow at
sub-optimal rates or experience undesirable patterns of economic activity (due to the
presence of a development capital gap). Market or social underinvestment may thus
impair the competitive development of certain cities or regions. Such underinvestment
would obviously be an appropriate object of concern for local and regional leaders.
The issue of capital gaps is a challenging one. It is very difficult to prove
definitively the presence or absence of such gaps. In order to do so, one must have access
to both supply-side data on the venture capital industry and detailed demand-side data on
the quality and quantity of demand at the firm level. In this thesis I will primarily
investigate the supply side of the capital gap story. I will analyze data from a national
survey of venture capital firms (which I conducted in February and March of 1998) to
determine whether the supply-side characteristics of the venture capital industry are
consistent with the existence of capital gaps. I will also utilize these data to draw
conclusions about the likely characteristics and attributes of such gaps.
Before discussing the survey results and their implications for capital gaps, I will
analyze several key issues concerning the venture capital industry and indigenous
economic growth strategies. The first important question is, why should we care about
venture capital? In order to assess the operation of the venture capital industry and its
impact on regional economic development, we must have knowledge of how venture
capital fits into economic development strategies. If it were the case that venture capital
did not make unique or substantial contributions to regional economies, then the presence
or absence of capital gaps would be of little concern. Specifically, we must ask, what is
the economic rationale behind indigenous growth strategies, and how is venture capital
related to this rationale? I will argue that venture capital is tied to innovation,
technological rents, and increased export levels. All of these elements are critical to
indigenous growth strategies and the continued competitiveness of high factor-cost
regions.
After exploring the nexus between venture capital and indigenous growth, I will
discuss issues surrounding small firms and economic growth. The role of small firms in
economic development-particularly with regard to employment growth-has recently
come under attack. Because venture capital is inevitably involved with small firms, it is
important to examine the implications of the small firm debate for arguments concerning
the significance of venture capital. As with venture capital's contribution to regional
economic growth, if it were the case that doubts about the role of small firms in economic
development greatly diminished the importance of venture capital, then the presence or
absence of capital gaps in the venture capital markets would lose a great deal of relevance
for planners and policymakers. I will argue that the significance of venture capital
depends upon the importance of startup firms-which may be small-but not on small
firms per se.
Following the small firm discussion, I will analyze aggregate venture capital
industry trends in order to develop a context for the presentation of the survey results. I
will attempt to derive lessons from this analysis regarding the possibilities and limitations
of venture capital in economic development. Specifically, I will explore what the size,
cyclicality, concentration, import-export characteristics, and fund sources of the industry
imply about venture capital's role in regional economic development. I will also point to
some of the structural characteristics of the venture capital industry that may result in
capital gaps.
I will then present evidence from the survey concerning capital gaps. I will discuss
the compatibility of the survey data with the existence of capital gaps. I will also analyze
the likely contours of such gaps. I will argue that venture capital gaps are most likely to
exist by investment stage and size. Regional and industry gaps are also probable. Finally,
I will tie the above discussions together by drawing general conclusions about capital
gaps, the venture capital industry, and regional economic development. Ultimately, I find
that capital gaps are related to the institutional characteristics of the supply-side of the
venture capital industry and not to the overall level of the supply of venture capital. I also
conclude that any venture capital-related policy interventions must take the procyclicality
of the venture capital-industry into account.
The specific chapter plan is as follows. In Chapter II, I will lay out the theories
underpinning indigenous economic growth strategies and then connect venture capital to
these theories. In Chapter III, I will discuss the characteristics of startups and small firms
and how these characteristics relate to the argument for venture capital's role in regional
economic development. In Chapter IV, I will describe the way in which aggregate venture
capital industry trends and attributes place bounds on the potential economic development
impact of venture capital. In Chapter V, I will present the results of the survey of venture
capital firms in order to draw inferences about the presence or absence of capital gaps and
the likely characteristics of such gaps. Finally, in Chapter VI, I will summarize my
conclusions and point to the policy implications of my findings.
CHAPTER H
ECONOMIC THEORIES AND INDIGENOUS REGIONAL GROWTH
From a theoretical perspective, the main questions behind indigenous growth
models are: what the economic mechanisms that allow for the creation of dense networks
of firms within a prescribed geographic area, and what are the economic benefits of these
concentrations? There are a number of theories that set forth these issues. My contention
is that innovation-based localization economies provide the principal rationale for
indigenous growth strategies. The existence of the product life cycle further underscores
the importance of indigenous growth strategies and the technological rents they are
capable of producing. Venture capital is a key enabling ingredient in innovation-based
strategies. Without adequate venture capital, high factor-cost regions would be unable to
commercialize innovation and command technological rents. Venture capital is also
significant because it is associated with the promotion of businesses-particularly
manufacturing firms-that have high levels of exports. Such exports are of great
importance to indigenous regional growth.
General Theories of Indigenous Growth
Central to all of the theories of indigenous growth is the existence of
agglomeration economies. Agglomeration economies can be defined as the greater-than-
proportional factor productivity gains that result from the dense clustering of firms in a
given geographical area. To the extent that these benefits accrue to all firms in a
metropolitan area, they are referred to as urbanization economies. To the extent that
these benefits accrue to a cluster of firms in a particular industry, they are referred to as
localization economies. The distinction is important. Urbanization economies come from
what Michael Porter refers to as "generalized" factor endowments (Porter 1990, p. 78).2
These factors, which contrast with "specialized" factor endowments, include such features
2 In addition to differentiating between generalized and specialized factor endowments, Porter also
employs a parallel classification scheme involving basic and advanced factor endowments. Although
some distinction between the two systems exists, it is not crucial to the current discussion. I will therefore
only refer to the generalized/specialized categories. See The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990).
as highways, a college-educated labor pool, a wide array of general suppliers, and basic
financial services. The presence of these factors has the effect of lowering key firm costs,
such as transportation, communication, and labor search costs.
Most of these more basic factor endowments are related to the size of a
metropolitan area, as opposed to any particular specialization of such an area. As Edwin
Mills has noted, empirical evidence has shown that "a doubling of MSA [Metropolitan
Statistical Area] size leads to a 4-6 percent increase in MSA total factor productivity"
(Mills 1993, p. 198). Of course, this statistic does not imply that we will see ever-
increasing urban concentration in the future. Much of the enhanced productivity stemming
from the urban concentration of capital and human resources just compensates for the
higher factor costs associated with such areas (DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996, p. 110).
What the existence of higher MSA productivity provides us with is the economic rationale
for cities. The general factors giving rise to urbanization economies are the baseline
conditions for the continued existence of competitive urban areas. However, these
urbanization factors tell us little about the reasons why particular cities and regions grow
or decline. Indeed, it is the concentration of particular industries or groups of related
industries through localization economies that sheds light on interurban variation and
differences in regional economic growth.
Localization economies arise from the presence of specialized factors of
production. As opposed to their generalized counterparts, specialized factors are specific
to particular industries. These factors range from specialized suppliers to a labor force
highly trained in narrowly designated fields to research institutions undertaking cutting-
edge scientific studies. The presence of such factors allows firms in specific industries to
undertake new projects and secure skilled labor more quickly and inexpensively than
similar firms that lack easy access to these same factors. Such specialized factors also
allow for the development of competitive local markets that simultaneously stimulate new
product demand and prepare a firm for global competition (Porter 1990, p. 71). The
increasing returns that these external economies give rise to result in the spatial
concentration, or clustering, of particular industries in particular geographic regions
(Krugman, 1991, p. 5). However, the story of localization economies is more complicated
than a simple story of firms responding to exogenous specialized factor endowments.
First, these endowments are created through a dynamic, interactive process; they are not
simply inherited (Porter 1990, p. 80; Krugman, 1991, p. 7). Second, the reduced
transaction costs relating to specialized labor and suppliers are of secondary importance.
It is the capacity to innovate that is the most important feature of specialized,
geographically concentrated firms embedded within the above-described context. I will
deal with the implications of these two points in order.
Economic theories concerning agglomeration economies and industry clustering
must constantly wrestle with ambiguities concerning causation. Although it is certainly
true that firms respond to factor conditions and that trade and exports follow regional
differences, successful firms generating jobs and wealth in a particular industry also
stimulate the further development of beneficial factor conditions. In addition, industries
may cluster in certain geographic areas as a result of the deliberate actions of government
or arbitrary historical turns of events. It is this bi-directional character of causation that
provides a link between theories of localization economies and economic development
policies. The potential for influencing the development of localization economies through
the nurture of specialized factor conditions forms the core of indigenous growth-oriented
regional economic development strategies. The rationale behind this thesis' investigation
of the venture capital industry is that venture capital is one of the specialized factors
whose creation and promotion may lead to greater industry clustering. As Black and
Gilson have shown, the structure of the venture capital industry in particular countries has
powerful effects on the type and level of venture financing available for new, young firms
(1998). At least some of the observed differences in venture capital industry structure
derive from the "instrumental hand of politics" (1998, p. 244). Venture capital, as a
partially created specialized factor of production, may well have the power to interact
positively with other factors of production, thereby stimulating greater concentration in
targeted industries.
With regard to the second complicating factor mentioned above, one of the
reasons it is quite difficult to measure the effects of localization economies is that one of
the chief benefits of such firm agglomeration is thought to be increased technological
innovation through knowledge "spillovers" between firms, local institutions, etc. It is an
easier task to model and measure transportation or labor search costs given a fixed
technology than it is to determine what constitutes technological innovation and how
much of that innovation derives from external economies due to firm location. The
evidence, however, does suggest that commercial applications of innovations are related
to geographic proximity to the sources of innovation. Utilizing patent citations as a proxy
for innovation, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) study the localization of
innovation through knowledge spillovers. They find that patent citations are "two to six
times as likely" to come from within the same metropolitan areas as the original cited
patent once self-citing patents are removed (1993, p. 591).3 Audretsch and Feldman also
present evidence concerning innovation and the clustering behavior predicted by theories
involving localization economies (1994). Analyzing the SBA's Innovation Database, these
two researchers find that industries in which new economic knowledge plays an important
role (as measured by the level of R&D, skilled labor, and reliance on university research)
have a significantly greater likelihood of concentration of both production and innovation
(as measured by announcements of innovative new products in trade journals).4 More
recently, researchers have developed positive evidence concerning the presence of venture
capital and technological innovation. I will discuss these findings later in this chapter.
It is the apparent connection between clustered economic activity and the rate and
incidence of innovation that provides the most compelling case for the promotion of
industry concentration as an economic development strategy. There are two potentially
desirable outcomes that stem from concentrated innovation. The first is that such
innovation may stimulate the birth of new innovative firms in the future as well as the
present, thus creating an ongoing cycle of new jobs, flexible adaptation, and technological
leadership. The second is that having a dynamic mix of innovative small firms "in the
hopper" increases the chance that, when a new industry is born, one of the firms in your
region will be able to ride the wave of growth and expand to become a corporate giant,
employing tens of thousands of workers. The relative importance of these two outcomes
' Self-citations occur when the same company or university cites one of its own patents in its application
for a new patent. Such cases are removed because they do not represent external economies of innovation.
is clearly related to the role of small firms in regional economies. This is a subject that I
will deal with in Chapter III.
It would appear from the above discussion that industry clustering benefits firms
and that urban areas consisting of such clusters have fundamental advantages over isolated
firms in the form of increasing returns. However, a wrinkle exists in this picture. It turns
out, as America discovered in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, that agglomeration economies
become less important to firms as their products, technologies, and industries mature. In
fact, the high factor costs that accompany agglomeration economies due to rents for
skilled labor, expensive land, and high commuting costs (DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996,
p. 110) serve as an impediment to profit maximization as firms move from strategies of
innovation to strategies of commodity production. As Norton and Rees (1979) pointed
out, this observed product cycle transformation from research and development to mass
production has a spatial component to it. As the innovative products of a dense industrial
area (such as the traditional U.S. manufacturing belt) become standardized, plant
production will migrate to low-wage areas (as U.S. industrial production migrated to the
South and the West). Ann Markusen (1985) has further elaborated on this phenomenon
by linking it to the profit-maximizing behavior of firms. In the beginning of what she
refers to as the "profit life cycle," firms invest in the pursuit of product and process
innovations. Following this zero-profit stage comes a super-profit stage in which firms
extract excess profits due to a temporary technological monopoly (1985, p. 27). This
stage is followed by stabilized profit stages resulting from market entry and competition.
A negative profit stage arises when an industry sector or its core product becomes
obsolete. The stabilized and negative profit stages are characterized by a shift in firm
strategy toward reduction in factor costs. As with the Norton and Rees formulation, these
latter stages are likely to result in the movement of production away from high-wage
regions and urban areas.
The implications of these spatial patterns of economic activity for economic
development strategy are substantial. Specifically, the cyclical stages of production and
profit indicate that constant innovation is essential for mature urban areas with high factor
4 See Audretsch and Feldman (1994), pp. 13-14.
costs, for the future benefits of today's innovations may well be lost to other regions with
more competitive factor costs. Mature, high-wage urban areas have little choice but to
pursue "super-profit" strategies involving firms that can extract technological rents from
innovation-based monopolies. It is only natural for such areas to wonder what the role of
venture capital is in undertaking these economic development strategies.
The Venture Capital Connection
Venture capital, which began as a distinct financial sector in the 1940s, can be
defined as "equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, where
the investor is a financial intermediary who is typically active as a director, an advisor, or
even a manager of the firm" (Kortum and Lerner 1998, p. 6). As such, venture capital is
more than just another diversified financial instrument that adds flexibility to a local
economy. Despite the fact that regional economic theorists have often ignored the role of
differentiated capital markets in regional economic development, venture capital is
essential to the operation of innovation-based localization economies. Just as economists
have difficulty modeling external economies, knowledge spillovers, and firms with
increasing returns to scale, traditional sources of debt capital have great difficulty
underwriting and monitoring small, risky firms with unproven-and potentially
innovative-technologies or strategies. Economists refer to this situation as a problem of
information asymmetries. The information that is available to the entrepreneur or small
firm manager is much different than the information that is available to a banker who relies
on standardized industry patterns and benchmarks to manage his or her portfolio. These
asymmetries heighten the possibility of mutually disadvantageous behavior. The differing
nature of debt and equity investment further increases the chance of conflicting incentives.
Equity holders may gamble with firm assets or refuse to contribute equity capital to
positive net present value projects in the presence of substantial amounts of debt because
the owners of the firm have little to lose (or gain in the latter case).' At the same time, a
risky firm will have a hard time attracting additional equity investments in the presence of
existing debt because of the seniority of debtors' claims on firm assets. Venture capital
5 For a discussion of agency conflicts, see Brealey and Myers (1996), pp. 491-493.
firms minimize the impact of these information asymmetries and agency conflicts by
staging the release of capital, closely monitoring performance, and taking an active role in
the management of the companies they invest in (Gompers 1995, p. 1461). As a result,
venture capitalists enable startup firms relying upon localization economies to
commercialize innovation and expand operations. In the absence of venture financing,
risky research and product development would have to be internalized within larger
corporate entities, thereby reducing the role of external economies in innovation and
potentially the rate of innovation itself
The consequences of such a development for high factor-cost regions could be
severe. The severing of the connection between external economies and commercial
innovation would transform the geography of innovation. Innovation and its
accompanying technological rents would become footloose (dominated by firms that are at
later stages of the profit/product life cycle), and high factor-cost regions would have to
abandon indigenous growth strategies for alternative "low road" approaches to economic
development. There are many reasons, of course, why these things do not happen,
including the presence of skilled labor markets and specialized research institutions.
However, it should be clear that without sufficient venture capital, regions (and cities, as
well) run the risk of failing to commercialize innovation and extract technological rents
from startup firms in early stages of the profit/product life cycle. Although the original
theorists either minimized or omitted altogether analysis of venture capital, we can see
from this discussion that the venture capital industry plays a critical part in both the
industry cluster and product/profit life cycle theories outlined above.
Given this argument for the significance of venture capital, we would expect to
find evidence of the connection between venture capital and innovation. We would also
expect to find evidence linking venture capital with firm growth and industry clusters in
ways that are consistent with the operation of localization economies. As discussed
above, direct evidence concerning innovation and knowledge spillovers is hard to come
by. Analysts must generally limit their focus to product innovations because process
innovations are largely unrecorded. Despite these difficulties, researchers have found
some evidence regarding venture capital and innovation. Kortum and Lerner (1998)
analyze a 1965-1992 national data set on manufacturers and a 1990-1994 Massachusetts
data set on Middlesex County manufacturers to assess the relationship between venture
capital and innovation. They compare R&D expenditures, the number of venture-backed
companies, and industry and firm patenting rates. On a national level, the authors find that
"a doubling of firms receiving venture financing translates into between a 5% and 18%
increase in the rate of [an industry's] patenting" (Kortum and Lerner 1998, p. 2). This
patent effect was most pronounced in industries that contained the largest information
asymmetries (as measured by book-to-market value). The results for the Massachusetts
firms likewise showed significant increases in patent filings and citations for individual
venture-backed firms. Venture capital thus does appear to be associated with the
incidence of innovation.
Separately, Lerner has also evaluated the impact of government-subsidized venture
capital on the firms that received Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) awards in
the early and mid-1980s (Lerner 1997). These awards are staged infusions of capital that
11 participating federal agencies administer to small technology-based companies.
Although the SBIR awards are somewhat different than traditional venture capital because
the government agencies that make the investments do not receive ownership stakes in
these businesses, the program does provide a good indication of the effect of non-debt
venture-type investments on small technology-based companies. After comparing the
sales and employment performance of the recipient firms with firms receiving no such
investments, Lerner found that "[o]ver a ten year period, the SBIR awardees enjoyed
substantially greater employment and sales growth than the matching firms" (1997, p. 3).
Specifically, between 1985 and 1995, SBIR awardees added a mean of 26 employees and
increased sales by an average of $4 million. By contrast, firms that did not receive SBIR
funds added only 5 employees on average and saw revenues rise by $600,000. The SBIR
study also provides evidence that successful venture investments have a geographic
concentration that is consistent with localization economies. The performance differences
between SBIR and non-SBIR firms were only significant in geographic areas that had
substantial levels of new firm births (as indicated by the presence of early stage venture
capital). Thus isolated venture-type investments had little impact, while investments that
were made in firms with geographic proximity to other new firms had a pronounced
impact. These results indicate that venture capital-type investments are related to both the
productive commercialization of innovation and the operation of localization economies.
Although we cannot conclude that venture capital caused the above outcomes, the
findings are consistent with a picture of venture capital as an important enabling ingredient
in localized innovation and firm growth.
Exports, Venture Capital, and Manufacturing
Having established the connection between venture capital and indigenous growth,
I will turn to issues related to firm type and growth strategy. What does economic growth
mean for a metropolitan area or a region? Does the creation of some types of firms have a
larger impact than the creation of other types? Leaving the discussion of small firms and
employment to Chapter II, I will briefly discuss here the intersection between venture
investments, firm market-type, and economic growth strategy.
New or expanding firms have three options for growth: regional displacement,
import substitution, or exports.6 Regional displacement involves the attraction of regional
market share away from existing regional firms. Import substitution involves the
attraction of regional market share away from firms located outside the region. Exports
involve the sale of products and services to customers outside of the region. Of these
three, exports are considered to be the most attractive from an economic development
standpoint because they bring in external capital that expands the size of the regional
economy. This increased "export base" can then stimulate growth in goods and services
that are sold within the region. Given this desirability, it is worth asking what the
relationship between venture capital and exports is. It is also worth asking whether firms
in some industry sectors have a greater propensity to export than firms in other sectors.
With regard to venture capital, it turns out that venture-backed businesses export
goods and services at substantially greater rates than the economy as a whole. Although
6 Creation of a new market through the introduction of a new product might constitute a fourth growth
option. However, new product markets must generally displace existing product markets. Thus for a
constant consumption rate this "new" growth fits into the scheme of regional displacement, import
substitution, and exports.
regional export data are unavailable, we can use international exports as a proxy for the
importance of extra-regional markets to a given set of firms. In a 1997 survey of venture-
backed companies conducted by Coopers & Lybrand and VentureOne, researchers found
that the "average one-year-old survey company already generates 17 percent of [its]
revenues from export sales." Furthermore, "By the time the company is five years old, 36
percent of [its] revenues [flow] from export sales."7 By way of comparison, exports
constituted 13.1% of private industry GDP in 1996.8 Venture-backed companies thus
appear to offer enhanced export potential to the national economy and, by extension, the
regional economies in which they are located.
The desirability of exports for regional economic development also indicates one
of the main reasons why planners, policymakers, and local business officials should
continue to care about the fate of manufacturing enterprises in the regional economy.
Overall, manufacturers account for a disproportionate percentage of total exports relative
to their share of the economy.9 Although manufacturers represent only 20% of private
industry GDP, the goods they produce make up 71% of total exports. In 1996,
manufactured goods accounted for $617.5 billion out of $870.9 billion in total U.S.
exports.' 0 Although it is true that the United States runs a net trade deficit in goods and a
net trade surplus in services, this situation does not diminish the fact that, from a dollar-
volume standpoint, manufacturers play a greater role than service firms in the generation
of international exports. Even on a regional basis, where service exports play a much
greater role than they do in the international arena, the higher wages and denser economic
linkages associated with manufacturing exports provide compelling reasons to pay special
attention to manufacturing (Cohen and Zysman 1987, pp. 19, 204-205).
From the above discussion, we can see that the promotion of exports provides us
with another reason for taking a strong interest in venture capital and venture capital-
oriented indigenous growth strategies. Venture-backed firms exhibit both high levels of
exports and rapid export growth. Of particular interest is the manufacturing sector and its
' National Venture Capital Association, Seventh Annual Economic Impact of Venture Capital Study,
1997, p. 11.
8 Calculated based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
9 Once again, I will use international export data as a proxy for general export behavior.
intersection with venture capital. Capital gaps in the manufacturing sector might have a
disproportionate impact on regional export bases. I will return to the subject of
manufacturing, new firms, and venture capital in the next few chapters.
In this chapter, I have laid out the reasons why planners, policymakers, and
business leaders should care about venture capital. Venture capital is a vital part of the
indigenous growth strategies that high factor-cost regions are turning to in order to
maintain and enhance competitiveness. Specifically, venture capital is linked to increased
innovation, technological rents, and exports. The contributions of venture capital in these
areas establish the relevance of venture capital to regional economic development and
provide a reason for investigating the operating characteristics of the industry and the
issue of capital gaps.
1 Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1996.
CHAPTER III
STARTUPS, SMALL FIRMS AND EMPLOYMENT
Before moving on to a detailed discussion of the venture capital industry (Chapter
IV) and an assessment of survey evidence regarding capital gaps (Chapter V), it is
necessary to explore one additional issue pertaining to the significance of venture capital in
economic development. Having set forth venture capital's relation to economic theories, I
will now examine issues concerning the role of small firms in the U.S. economy and the
implications of these issues for our investigation of venture capital.
Small firms, which are typically defined as businesses with fewer than 100
employees, are an integral part of innovation-based indigenous growth strategies. Indeed,
economic development strategies that rely on venture capital and localization economies
inevitably involve small firms. The average venture-backed firm has just 21 employees
one year into its existence. 1 Furthermore, only innovation that takes place through
clusters of small firms is dependent upon external economies. If a few large firms were to
conduct all of the innovative research and product development activities in a given area,
the economies of innovation would become internalized within these companies, and the
link between firm innovation and the enabling urban area would be broken. However,
although the benefits of innovation are not very controversial, the relative advantages and
disadvantages of small firms are. During the past 20 years a very contentious debate has
taken place over the role of small firms in job creation. Proponents of small firms have
consistently asserted that it is these firms that are responsible for the lion's share of new
jobs in the American economy (Birch 1979, 1987). Skeptics, citing methodological errors
and data inconsistencies in the writings of the small business camp, have pointed out that
small businesses have high rates of job destruction and often have lower job quality than
large businesses (Harrison 1994).
Is the argument in favor of small firms also an argument for venture capital-based
strategies? We have seen that innovation is important for regional economic development,
" National Venture Capital Association, Seventh Annual Economic Impact of Venture Capital Study,
1997, p. 6.
but is this only due to the technological rents of such innovation, or does a small firm
employment argument exist as well? One of the sources of confusion in the small firm
debate has been the failure to distinguish between small firms as startups and small firms as
small firms. In making arguments about small firms, it is important to note whether the
argument concerns startups that happen to be small, or small firms whose principal
attribute is their small size. I will first discuss the characteristics of small firms as startups.
I will review evidence that startups in different industries have different survival and
employment profiles. I will then discuss small firms as small firms. I will analyze data that
show that in the sector in which startups have the most job-generation potential, small
firms do not play a disproportionate role in job creation while they are small. In other
words, the data indicate that the case for small firms as startups is more compelling than
the case for small firms as small firms. Ultimately, the strongest justification for
indigenous growth models and their associated venture capital components lies in the
above-described innovation theories and in the fact that the small firms that are generated
may one day become large firms. The continued existence of small firms as small firms is
not essential to the argument for venture capital's significance in economic development.
Small Firms as Startups
Economists from Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) conducted a study based on their
database in 1994 to determine what the job performance and survival rates are for firms
founded in 1985 (Duncan and Handler 1994). Of the 249,768 startups that began
operating in 1985, 99.6% had fewer than 100 employees and 93.6% had fewer than 20
employees in 1985. The authors find that 69.7% of these 1985 startups remained active in
1994. This survival rate stands in contrast to the widely reported statistic that four out of
five small businesses fail in their first few years of operation. However, it should be noted
that D&B only tracks companies that "are active in business, often purchasing supplies,
selling products, or otherwise meriting a review of their importance, reliability, and
resources" (1994, p. 9). Even among this group, a direct request for information about a
company from a third-party is often necessary for a firm to make it into the D&B
database. Thus the reported survival rate is probably inflated. Nevertheless, the D&B
database provides an interesting look at a large group of new firms and has the advantage
of excluding solo consultants and shell corporations.1 2 The industry breakdowns of the
data are worth presenting in detail. These breakdowns, which are contained in Table 1,
demonstrate a number of intriguing patterns.
The survival rates for the 1985 D&B startups in Table 1 are comparatively high
across the board. Industry differences do exist, however. The industry figures reveal that
service firms, FIRE industry firms, and construction firms are among the most likely
startups to remain in business (I am ignoring agricultural and mining firms because they
constitute such a small percentage of startups).'" All have survival rates in excess of 70%
for the period from 1985 to 1994. By contrast, manufacturing and wholesale trade firms
have survival rates of only 61% for the same period. The survival rates of the retail trade
and transportation/public utilities industries fall in between these two industry groupings.
It should be noted that not all of the firms who do not survive are business failures. The
discontinued firms column indicates the number of firms who ceased operations without
outstanding debts. Although some of these are no doubt unsustainable businesses, some
are also firms that were acquired by larger corporations and thus no longer appear as
independent small firms.
Table 1. 1985 Startups: Survival and Change in Employment 1985-1994 by Sector
Survival Figures | Employent Changes of Survivors (% Shares)
# Firms # Firms Survival Lost Lost Lost Gained Gained Gained Gained
Started Discon Failed Rate >10 1-9 Any Chan Any 1-9 10-99 >100
Industry in 1985 tinued (%) Emp. Emp. Emp. ge Emp. Emp. Emp. Emp.
Agriculture 3,715 354 144 86.6 0.8 5.4 6.2 80.1 13.7 10.8 2.7 0.2
Mining 2,354 726 235 59.2 2.2 12.1 14.3 67.0 18.6 14.4 3.7 0.5
Construction 35,012 6,636 2,858 72.9 1.2 8.3 9.5 70.0 20.4 15.8 4.4 0.2
Manufacturing 21,999 6,193 2,291 61.4 2.2 10.7 12.9 46.9 40.2 24.5 13.7 2.0
Trans./Pub. Util. 8,914 2,225 775 66.3 1.9 8.4 10.3 63.5 26.2 16.7 8.2 1.3
Wholesale Trade 29,237 8,932 2,456 61.0 1.0 11.2 12.2 55.2 32.6 25.7 6.5 0.4
Retail Trade 72,813 17,580 5,728 68.0 1.3 11.9 13.2 65.3 21.4 17.8 3.3 0.3
Finance/Ins./R.E. 16,179 3,759 889 71.3 2.1 9.6 11.7 68.6 19.7 13.2 5.5 1.0
Services 57,419 10,328 3,037 76.7 1.3 18.7 20.0 57.9 22.0 15.9 5.3 0.8
Source: Duncan and Handler (1994), Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, Economic Analysis Department.
12 Analysts have pointed out other matters of concern regarding the Dun & Bradstreet database, but these
issues do not affect the following discussion. See Harrison (1994) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996).
13 FIRE is an acronym for finance, insurance, and real estate.
The percentage breakdowns of employment change by sector add interesting depth
to the picture of this cohort of D&B startups. Among the 1985 firms still active in 1994,
64.7% saw no change in employment, while 11% lost employees and 24% gained
employees. These figures vary considerably by industry. In general, surviving
manufacturing and wholesale trade startups showed more volatility than firms in other
sectors. Surviving manufacturing startups were the most likely either to lose more than
ten employees or to gain more than 100 employees out of all industry sectors.
Manufacturing and wholesale trade were the most likely among the survivors to
demonstrate a net gain in total employees. Forty percent of manufacturing survivors and
33% of wholesale trade survivors added jobs between 1985 and 1994. These figures
contrast with 22% of service survivors, 21% of retail survivors, and 20% of FIRE industry
survivors. On the job loss side of the equation, service survivors led the pack. Twenty
percent of service survivors lost employees between 1985 and 1994. This compares with
13% for retail, 12% for FIRE and wholesale trade, and 13% for manufacturing. Thus
while manufacturing and wholesale trade have the highest failure rates among industries,
surviving firms in these sectors displayed greater employment growth potential than other
industry sectors. Manufacturing and wholesale trade survivors also possessed
comparatively high job loss percentages, but these two sectors trailed services and were
comparable to retail and the FIRE industries in this regard. These results argue against
lumping all small startups into a single category. The industry breakdowns are consistent
with a picture of startup manufacturing and wholesale trade businesses as high-risk/high-
reward enterprises. Service, retail, construction, and the FIRE industries have more
staying power in terms of survival, but less upside job-generating potential. Small firms as
startups thus seem to provide significant (if risky) employment growth opportunities, at
least in the manufacturing and trade sectors. 14
"4 Analysis of the regional breakdowns of the Dun & Bradstreet survival data (not shown) reveals that the
above industry patterns are fairly consistent across regions.
Small Firms as Small Firms
Having analyzed the differences in startup employment growth by industry, I will
now examine existing evidence on the employment importance of small firms in the sector
that demonstrated the most startup job-growth potential: manufacturing. Data on this
issue comes from three economists who make use of the Census Bureau's Longitudinal
Research Database (LRD). Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) analyze data on the
manufacturing sector from 1973 to 1988 to draw out lessons about the role of small firms,
startups, and shutdowns in employment and the U.S. economy. Davis et al. find that,
relative to their employment levels, small manufacturers "exhibit sharply higher gross job
creation rates but not higher net creation rates" than large manufacturers (1996, p. 57). In
absolute terms, the researchers find that large manufacturing firms create and eliminate far
more jobs than small manufacturing firms (1996, p. 73). Tables 2 and 3 present the
disaggregated results.
Table 2. Net and Gross Job Flow Rates by Employer Size
Category: Mean Annual Rates, 1973-1988
# of Job Job Loss Job NetCreation Reallocation Growth
Employees Rate Rate Rate Rate
0-19 15.8 17.5 33.3 -1.6
20-49 11.9 13.4 25.3 -1.5
50-99 11.2 12.0 23.2 -0.8
100-249 10.7 11.1 21.9 -0.4
250-499 10.1 10.3 20.4 -0.2
500-999 9.7 10.4 20.1 -0.6
1,000-2,499 8.9 9.5 18.5 -0.6
2,500-4,999 8.4 9.5 17.9 -1.1
5,000-9,999 7.9 9.2 17.1 -1.3
10,000-24,999 7.1 8.5 15.6 -1.4
25,000-49,000 6.9 8.1 15.0 -1.3
50,000 or more 6.6 8.0 14.6 -1.4
Note: Rates calculated by average firm size method; see text for explanation.
Source: Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).
Table 2 breaks out the differences in job creation and job loss by average firm size.
These rates are calculated by taking the total jobs created or destroyed in a given year and
dividing by the average plant employment size over the entire 1973-1988 period. By
assigning firms a single mean size for the entire period, Davis et al. control for the
deceptive regression-to-the-mean effect by which periodic fluctuations in firm size inflate
small firm job growth statistics. Table 2 also contains a job reallocation column. This
statistic is merely the sum of the job creation and loss rates. It indicates the overall level
of churning or shuffling taking place in a given employment category. The final column of
Table 2 is the net job growth rate. This rate is equal to the job creation rate minus the job
loss rate. It indicates the net employment growth as a percentage of average firm size.
The results in Table 2 are informative. Small manufacturers have much higher job creation
rates than their larger counterparts, but also have much higher job destruction rates. Firms
with an average of less than 20 employees expand employment at annual rates of roughly
16% of their employment base and eliminate employment at rates of around 18%. Firms
with an average of between 500 and 1,000 workers, by contrast, create and eliminate jobs
at rates of about 10%. In net terms, the job-creation performance of small firms does not
stand out. Reflecting the troubles of U.S. manufacturing during this period, net
employment growth rates are fairly uniform across the board. All firm sizes saw job losses
at rates ranging from -0.2 to -1.6. The job reallocation rate indicates that the overall
stability ofjobs increases as firms grow larger. Total job loss and creation activity
represents 33% of the smallest firms' average employment base, as opposed to 19% for
firms with between 1,000 and 2,500 employees. Ultimately, these figures emphasize the
idea that small manufacturers have a greater amount of overall job fluctuation than large
firms, but as a class of firms they do not have significantly different net job growth rates
than other size classes of firms.
Table 3 depicts the shares of absolute levels of employment growth by average
firm size of manufacturer. It is apparent that larger firms account for most of the job
creation and job loss that occurred in the manufacturing sector from 1973 to 1988. Firms
with greater than 100 employees are responsible for 76% of both jobs created and jobs
lost. This percentage is slightly less than such firms' 83% share of total manufacturing
employment. The smallest two categories of firms in the data set, those with less than 20
and less than 50 employees, did possess greater shares of jobs generated and lost than
their overall share of employment. Together these categories were responsible for
Table 3. Shares of Gross Job Creation and Loss
by Employer Size Category: Annual Averages as
Percentages of Employment, 1973-1988
Job Total# of Con Job Loss Employment
Employees Creation Share ShareShareShr
0-19 7.5 7.3 4.2
20-49 8.8 8.9 6.6
50-99 7.9 7.5 6.2
100-249 9.7 9.0 8.0
250-499 6.7 6.1 5.9
500-999 5.8 5.5 5.2
1,000-2,499 7.6 7.2 7.5
2,500-4,999 6.5 6.5 6.8
5,000-9,999 8.3 8.6 9.2
10,000-24,999 12.6 13.5 15.7
25,000-49,000 8.7 9.1 11.2
50,000 or more 10.1 10.9 13.5
Note: Shares calculated by average firm size method;
see text for explanation.
Source: Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).
16% ofjob creation and destruction, while they accounted for 11% of employment.
Nevertheless, it is clear that large firms are responsible for the bulk ofjob activity that
takes place in the manufacturing sector.
These results indicate that, for the manufacturing sector, the arguments concerning
innovation and expansion of the export base provide stronger rationales for venture
capital-oriented indigenous growth strategies than do arguments resting on the job-
creation role of small firms. However, this is not to say that the ultimate employment
contributions of small firms are not important. Although Davis et al. make a convincing
case concerning the aggregate impact of small firms while these firms are small, it is
important to note that tomorrow's large-firm growth derives in part from the existence of
small firms today. In the long run, it is not essential that particular small firms continue to
play important roles in a regional economy as smallfirms. It may well be that the most
important thing about small firms is that they may one day become large firms.
Furthermore, volatility and small aggregate employment figures do not diminish the
importance to high-wage regions of capitalizing on the early commercial prospects of
innovation. As Markusen has pointed out, it is likely that these regions will one day lose
the benefits of production as an innovation becomes standardized. Small firm job creation
may not be the driver of economic activity nationally, but the creation of innovative
startups (which generally begin as small firms) is an essential component of economic
development strategies for high-factor cost regions.
Doubts about the role of small firms as small firms thus do not diminish the
significance of the venture capital industry. The benefits of small firms as startups provide
a compelling rationale for continued investigation of the nature and possibilities of the
venture capital industry.
CHAPTER IV
THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY:
CHARACTERISTICS AND INVESTMENT PATTERNS
In order to assess venture capital's role in economic development and set the stage
for the discussion of capital gaps in Chapter V, it is necessary to examine certain detailed
aspects of the venture capital industry. We have already seen from Chapter II that the
rationale for venture capital-oriented indigenous growth strategies lies with the innovation,
technological rents, and increased exports that are associated with venture-backed firms.
However, the characteristics and investment patterns of the venture capital industry place
boundaries on the impact of venture capital on regional economic development. In this
chapter, I will analyze these characteristics, patterns, and boundaries. Specifically, I will
show how the venture capital industry's size, cyclicality, investment concentrations,
regional import-export patterns, and sources of funds all define the range of conclusions
that may be drawn regarding venture capital and regional economic development. This
analysis will also provide a context for the capital gap discussion in Chapter V.
Ultimately, venture capital is a small, but rapidly growing, portion of total
investment. It is limited in its ability to reverse economic downturns due to its procyclical
nature, and it is heavily concentrated in a small range of industries. Promotion of the
local venture capital industry is not necessarily equivalent to promotion of local investment
due to the export (leakage) of capital. The sources of funds and the general supply-side
characteristics of the industry have changed dramatically over the past few decades.
These shifts provide an explanation for the possible existence of capital gaps. I will utilize
existing industry data as well as interview material to describe these venture capital
industry aspects and develop interpretive boundaries for Chapter V.
Background and Definitions
As mentioned in Chapter II, venture capital is most often defined as equity or
equity-related investments in relatively young companies by institutional investors who
exert some level of management control. This definition captures both the orientation of
venture capital towards new businesses and the active role that venture capitalists play in
the management of the companies in which they invest. For the purposes of this thesis,
however, the above definition must be slightly enlarged. Because equity investment firms
who fall under the rubric of venture capital firms often make investments in the expansion
of later stage companies, I will also include substantial equity investments in later stage
firms with high growth potential under the general term "venture capital." It will often be
important to distinguish between "true" early stage venture capital and later stage equity
investments. In these instances, I will specifically refer to "early stage venture capital" to
make the distinction clear.
I should also note that my discussion refers to institutional venture capital, as
opposed to "angel" capital. Angel investors are wealthy individuals who make equity
investments in startup and pre-startup entrepreneurial enterprises. The amount of angel
and other "informal" capital is often estimated to be two to three times the size of the
institutional venture capital markets (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse 1995, p. 3). Angel
investors, along with personal savings and family money, are generally the only resources
available to entrepreneurs who cannot access institutional funds. However, there are
several reasons for minimizing discussion of angel capital. First, few data exist on angel
investments due to their non-institutional character. Second, because securing angel
capital is heavily dependent upon personal networks, and because angel investment is not
professionalized, there are many reasons to think that angel capital does not neatly smooth
out the wrinkles in the institutional venture capital markets. The existence of angel capital
does not diminish the importance of boundaries and gaps in the institutional venture
capital markets.
Throughout my discussion, I will rely on the following scheme of equity
investment stages":










capital provided to an entrepreneur for the purpose of concept
development;
investment in a new company for the purpose of product
development;
investment in an early stage firm for the purpose of initiating
full-scale operations or scaling up services/production;
capital for initial expansion of a company that has achieved
some level of production and sales;
equity or equity-related debt investment in a company for the
purpose of a major expansion; company may be mid- or late-
stage with significant revenues;
capital invested in a firm shortly before the firm goes public;
equity capital for the purpose of acquiring another company;
capital to finance a management buyout or other leveraged
buyout (LBO) of a product line or company; restructuring is
often involved.
Size and Cyclicality
By most accounts, the United States is currently awash in equity capital. Venture
capital investments have increased sharply over the past few years. In 1997, nearly 1250
venture capital firms invested $12.2 billion, a figure that represents an 83% nominal
increase over the 1995 total.16 Venture capital firms participated in 2,706 deals in 1997,
up from 1,543 in 1995. The average 1997 deal size was $4.5 million.17 From an
aggregate standpoint, the venture capital industry is clearly booming. The increased influx
of funds, coupled with the enviable growth of Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128,
have raised the profile of the industry considerably.
Despite this high profile, however, the venture capital industry remains a young
and volatile industry. As Figure 1 demonstrates, funding levels in 1980 were only a small
fraction of their current size in constant dollar terms. Total venture capital disbursements
in 1980 were equivalent to $1.36 billion in constant 1996 dollars. By 1996, disbursements
had grown to $9.42 billion. Figure 1 also indicates that the venture capital markets are
very sensitive to economic cycles. Real venture financing rose dramatically between 1980
16 Investment totals are from Coopers and Lybrand, Money Tree Report: 1997 Results (1998), p. 1. Total
number of firms is taken from Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital Sources: 1997 Edition (1998).
" Coopers and Lybrand, Money Tree Report: 1997 Results (1998), p. 1.
and 1989, fell sharply in the recession of the early 1990s, and-buoyed by a hot initial
public offerings (IPO) market-has been climbing rapidly since 1994.
Figure 1. U.S. Venture Capital Disbursements: 1980-1996
(millions of constant 1996 dollars)
Co N (0 11 (0 r-- CO 0) 0 Q14 't
S o Co W CO CO CO Co CO Co 0 o) 0) 0 ) )0 )0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 03)
Year
N VC Disbursements (millions of 1996$)
Source: data from Venture Economics; current figures deflated by GDP deflator (BEA).
Figure 2. U.S. Venture Capital Disbursements as a % of Fixed
Nonresidential Investment: 1980-1996
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Analyzing venture investment levels relative to overall investment in the U.S.
economy is also instructive. Figure 2 presents annual venture capital disbursements as a
percentage of total fixed nonresidential investment for the period from 1980 to 1996. The
graph makes several points clear. First, venture capital represents a very small percentage
(about 1%) of total investment. Second, venture investment has grown in percentage
terms. Venture capital's share of total investment increased by a factor of six during this
time period, expanding from 0.2% in 1980 to 1.2% in 1996. Finally, venture investments
are heavily pro-cyclical. When the economy is strong, venture investments increase as a
percentage of total investment. When the economy is weak, venture investments fall in
percentage terms. This cyclicality has important implications for economic development.
Theoretically, because returns are dependent on front-end pricing as well as future growth,
economic downturns should provide attractive bargains for high-risk equity that possesses
a longer time horizon than the risk-averse debt markets. As one Boston-based venture
capitalist put it, "It's always more profitable to launch a startup in a recession." 8 The
fluctuations in Figure 2 indicate that venture capital has not responded to this incentive
and thus has not had a stabilizing effect on the economy in the past. To the extent that
planners and local businessmen look to venture capital to spark growth in the midst an
economic downturn, they must beware of the fact that the venture capital markets have
not reversed economic trends in the past. It remains to be seen whether the venture
capital industry, as it matures and becomes more institutionalized, will have the capacity to
exert a positive countercyclical investment effect similar to that credited to the entrance of
public equity into the real estate markets.
The overall growth of the industry from the early 1980s to the present coincided
with two key events. The first of these was a demand-side effect: the 1980s explosion of
high-tech businesses in computer- and life science-related industries. The second event-a
supply-side effect-was the U.S. Department of Labor's 1978 change in the ERISA
"prudent man" standard for institutional retirement investments by pension funds
(Gompers and Lerner 1997, pp. 9-10). I will first trace the interactions between
18 November 12, 1997 interview, Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation.
technology and venture capital, and then turn to supply-side issues relating to sources of
funds.
Investment Concentrations
The simultaneous expansion of venture investing and high-tech industries was far
from coincidental. High-tech firms, with their temporary technological monopolies and
ability to create new standards and industries, traditionally have had the greatest potential
to earn the high returns sought by venture capitalists. Indeed, venture money has been
largely concentrated in a few industries. Figures 3 through 6 contain pie charts
representing venture investments by industry for four selected years over a 12-year period.
The figures demonstrate that computer related industries, electronics, telecommunications,
and medical/life science industries have typically accounted for between 70% and 80% of
total venture investments. In 1984, 1992, and 1996, these high-tech industries received
79%, 75%, and 71% of venture capital disbursements. Traditional non-high tech
manufacturing, by contrast, garnered 10%, 9%, and 7% of total venture investments in
these same years. These results offer one of the most obvious lessons about the venture
industry: growth in venture investments does not imply across-the-board industry
development.
Although venture capital investments are heavily concentrated in high-tech
industries, this concentration is neither static in composition nor fixed in its overall level.
The exception to the general pattern that makes this point is the pie chart representing
investment shares in 1988 (Figure 4). At that time, the four high-tech industries took in
only 53% of total venture investments. Analysis of more disaggregated data (not shown)
from the surrounding years reveals that this fluctuation is the result of industry shifts
within the high-technology sectors. As the computer hardware industry matured and
startups within the industry declined, venture capital investment briefly shifted to non-
high-tech industries. These shifts, which I will turn to now, shed light on key aspects of
the operation of the venture capital markets.

























































Source: data from Venture Economics.

















Source: data from Venture Economics.
Despite the popular impression of an ever-expanding computer industry that
attracts more and more venture investments every year, computer-related venture
investments have actually fluctuated substantially since 1980. Although computer-related
investments have been and continue to be one of the mainstays of the venture capital
world, the fortunes of subsectors of the computer industry have risen and fallen. In the
early 1980s, computer-related venture investments climbed from 23% of total venture
financing in 1980 to 43% in 1983 (Figure 7). This rise was largely fueled by increased
investment in the computer hardware industry. However, as the 1980s went on, hardware
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venture financing declined dramatically in both percentage and absolute terms. By 1990,
computer hardware represented only 9% of new venture investments, down from 33% in
1983. In constant 1990 dollars, hardware venture investments fell from $1.46 billion in
1983 to $341 million in 1990. While hardware investments continued to fall in the late
1980s, computer software and services firms were beginning to claim a larger share of
new venture investments. After modest growth in the 1980s, software rose from 7% of
total venture investment in 1989 to 27% in 1996.
One potential explanation for these industry shifts is the product/profit/firm life
cycle theories discussed in Chapter II. In keeping with these theories, computer hardware
startups appear to have declined in importance as the industry matured, leading to an
overall decline in the high-tech industries' share of venture financing in the years before
software startups began to increase dramatically. If this is the case, it would further
emphasize the importance of innovation-based external economies. Industry clustering or
concentration-even in high-tech industries-is not by itself sufficient to assure a region
of continued competitiveness. Continual innovation (spurred by technological spillovers)
and commercialization of this innovation through efficient venture capital markets are
necessary for a region to "shift gears" and capture the technological rents from a new
industry's temporary technological monopolies. Today's seedbed of startup high-tech
entrepreneurialism may become tomorrow's standardized large-firm-dominated industry.
Although such a development will often be positive in employment terms, high factor-cost
cities and regions risk losing these employment gains in addition to the technological rents
associated with innovation-based localization economies. Venture capital investment
concentrations are a bellwether of these changes. Planners and analysts should take note
of fluctuations in these concentrations in order to anticipate changes in the geography of
competitiveness.
One additional aspect of the above-described industry investment patterns is that in
the gap between the decline of hardware ventures and the rise of software/service
ventures, total venture investment levels remained high despite the reduction in computer-
related technological opportunities. The result was that, as Figure 4 shows, traditional
manufacturing, consumer related businesses, and other non-technological industries
increased their share of venture financing in the late 1980s. Absolute levels of venture
financing increased for these non-technological industries as well. Thus it may not be the
case that traditional industries are incompatible with venture capital investment. It may
just be that in most years such investments are crowded out by the relative attractiveness
of technological opportunities.
These occurrences both confirm and complicate the picture of macroeconomic
cyclicality discussed above. On the one hand, the maintenance of high investment levels in
the late 1980s (despite a falloff in computer investment opportunities) argues for the
primacy of macroeconomic growth factors over technology demand conditions. On the
other hand, the experiences of the early 1980s indicate that overall levels of venture
financing may react strongly with specific technological demand (the rise of the computer
hardware and life sciences industries). The lesson for economic development is most
likely that venture financing for particular industries responds both to the economy as a
whole (Figures 1 and 2) and to specific demand conditions.
Regional Import-Export of Funds
The characteristics of venture investing vary considerably by region of the country.
Some areas of the country invest a very high proportion of their venture capital close to
home, while other areas export the majority of their venture dollars. Specifically, as
Table 4. Percentage of Venture Capital Richard Florida has pointed out, venture
Dollars Invested in-State, 1996 capital firms in regions whose venture capital
California 58.0%
Massachusetts 30.0% industries are related to a local technology
Illinois 14.3% base will make substantial local investments.New York 9.4%
Source: Coopers & Lybrand 1996. These regions will have high venture capital
"capture" rates. By contrast, regions whose venture capital industries spring from the
presence of a financial industry will tend to export a large percentage of their venture
investments (Florida and Kenney 1988, p. 38; Florida and Smith 1990, p. 346). As Table
4 demonstrates, California is an example of a region whose indigenous business growth
opportunities capture the majority of regional venture capital. Californian venture capital
firms invested 58% of their total venture dollars in-state in 1996. New York, on the other
hand, is an example of a financial-center region whose indigenous businesses capture only
a small share of regional venture capital resources. New York venture firms invested only
9.4% of their 1996 venture dollars in New York companies. Massachusetts and Illinois
fall somewhere in between these two extremes. The intermediate status of the capture
rates of Massachusetts and Illinois may indicate that the venture capital industries in these
locations have both a local-industry and a financial-center rationale for their existence.
These regional patterns-particularly the New York example-emphasize the fact that,
despite information asymmetries that favor investment close to home, venture capital firms
frequently invest outside of the regions in which they are based. Whether this leakage is
due to the lack of an effective local demand or supply-side industry characteristics
(discussed in the following section), the presence of venture capital alone is no guarantee
of local or regional investment.
Sources of Funds
The sources of investments in private venture capital funds have altered
dramatically over the past 20 years. Venture funds, which are typically organized as
limited partnerships, raise money from a variety of corporate, institutional, and individual
investors. The composition of these investors was very different in the late 1970s than it
is today. In 1978, individuals and families provided 32% of investments in venture capital
funds (Figure 8).'9 Insurance companies supplied 16% of the total, and pension funds
contributed 15%. However, the U.S. Department of Labor's 1978 clarification of the
"prudent man" rule contained in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) of 1974 changed all of this. This rule, which required that pension fund
managers choose their investments with the care of a prudent man, had previously
discouraged venture investment. In its clarification, the Department of Labor stated that
portfolio diversification through high risk investments was an acceptable, or prudent,
strategy for the investment of retirement funds (Bygrave and Timmons 1992, p. 25;
Gompers and Lerner 1997, pp. 9-10). The result was a large upsurge in pension fund
investments in venture capital funds. As Figures 9 and 10 make clear, pension money
became the dominant source of venture capital, increasing to 46% of the total by 1988 and
55% by 1997.
19 Data for 1978 and 1988 are from the Venture Capital Journal, as reproduced in Bygrave and Timmons
1992, pp. 45-6. Data for 1997 were obtained directly from Venture Economics.
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This supply-side shift, together with the fund-raising growth described in the size
and cyclicality section, has had important consequences for the venture capital industry
and the issue of capital gaps. Specifically, the large influx of institutional money has
helped to push the venture industry towards larger investment sizes and later stage
investments.
Although the concept of capital gaps in the midst of a capital windfall at first seems
counterintuitive, the abundant fund supply and its character have altered the economics of
venture investing and thus the orientation of venture firms. As one Boston-based venture
capitalist put it: "There will be fewer true venture capital firms in five years than 15 years
ago, even though there will be ten times more firms calling themselves by that name."20
The problem is that small investments require the same amount of due diligence and
monitoring as large investments. As a result, heavily-capitalized venture funds have an
economic incentive to make a few larger investments rather than many smaller ones. Early
stage deals, which typically are smaller in size, have the added disadvantage of requiring
the most intensive research and monitoring (due to greater information asymmetries).
According to many venture capitalists, the consequence of these factors has been a shift
away from early-stage and small-size investments. As the managing director of a venture
capital firm located in Philadelphia noted: "One of our related funds raised more money
[than they had in their previous fund] and had to double the size of their investments." 2'
It is, of course, possible that the market will automatically correct any gaps that
result from these supply-side factors. Indeed, many analysts and venture capitalists believe
that increased competition for large deals and later stage opportunities will drive down
returns in these investment categories in the near future. Such an occurrence could impel
venture funds to fill underserved niches in the early-stage and small-deal markets.
However, self-correction is far from inevitable. The main reason lies with the institutional
pension investors discussed above. Like heavily capitalized venture investors, pension
fund managers have an incentive to reduce portfolio management overhead by putting
capital to work in large blocks. As a result, they are reluctant to invest in the small funds
that, in turn, are more likely to make small, early stage investments. As one New York-
based venture capitalist noted, returns are not the only consideration for pension fund
managers. Even if returns in large, late-stage equity investment funds fall, pension
investment managers will likely continue to invest in them because "what they [large, late-
stage equity investment funds] offer is the opportunity to invest $800 million at a clip."22
Another survey respondent pointed to the conservative bias that is built into the incentive
structure for pension fund managers: "[An] alternative investment manager gets no benefit
for doing better but he gets slaughtered if something goes wrong."23 As a whole, the
above scenario provides a plausible explanation for the existence and perpetuation of
capital gaps. In the face of the institutional supply-side characteristics of the venture
capital industry, lower returns alone may not guarantee the diversification of venture
investing into areas where capital gaps currently exist.
The empirical evidence for this supply-side capital gap hypothesis is mixed. The
data indicate that in percentage terms the industry has shifted toward later stage investing.
20 February 11, 1998 interview.
21 March 17, 1998 interview.
22 March 11, 1998 interview.
23 March 12, 1998 interview.
As Figure 11 demonstrates, the percentage of early stage investments has exhibited a
moderate but steady decrease over the past sixteen years, falling from around 40% to
about 30% of total venture investment. However, other industry data reveal that this shift
may be correlated with the returns generated by particular investment stages. Table 5
contains the comparative returns for early stage, late stage, and diversified funds over
different time periods. Although recent returns have been higher for venture capital firms
investing in early stage deals, the long-term returns of funds that make later stage
investments have consistently outpaced early-stage returns. During the period from 1993
to 1996 (three-year returns column), early stage venture funds had an average annualized
IRR of 39%, as opposed to 32% for later stage funds. By contrast, over the 10-year
period from 1986 to 1996, later stage funds realized an average return of 22% while early
stage funds generated an average return of only 17%.
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There are many ways to interpret these two sets of data. On the one hand, it is
possible to conclude that the shift a away from early stage investing represents a rational
allocation of capital to the opportunities offering the highest return. Such an
interpretation would indicate that public, or development, capital gaps are more likely to
exist than private, or market, capital gaps. Although this conclusion is plausible, it is a bit
too simplistic. It is important to remember that the shift towards later stage investments
has continued in the face of the high recent returns for early stage funds. In addition,
individual early stage deals that offer very attractive returns may suffer due to perceptions
of general venture capital trends over the past decade. Nevertheless, these data provide a
useful backdrop for the discussion of capital gaps in Chapter V.
Table 5. Investment Returns by Stage for
Funds Formed between 1969 and 1996
(Internal Rate of Return expressed as percentage)
Time Period
Fund Type 1 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 Year
Seed 46.7 31.1 22.0 14.6
Early Stage 42.9 39.0 25.5 17.3
Balanced 40.7 29.6 22.5 13.7
Later Stage 32.1 31.6 30.8 21.8
All Venture 40.1 31.9 23.9 15.1
Source: Venture Economics 1997 Annual Review.
From this chapter we can see that venture capital is a small, rapidly growing
portion of total investment that is highly concentrated in the computer and life-science
industries. Planners and others concerned with venture capital for economic development
reasons should beware the fact that the cyclicality of the industry may exacerbate rather
than soften movements in the regional economy. Analysts should also note that venture
capital's investment concentrations are not static. They seem to operate in accordance
with product/profit life-cycle theories. Furthermore, while the venture capital industry is
clearly heavily dependent upon technological demand, other industries may increase their
share of venture financing under certain macroeconomic conditions or as a result of
changes in the relative fortunes of various industries. Finally, trends in fund sources and
regional patterns are important. Differences in regional capture rates provide us with an
indication of how venture capital's uneven distribution varies along regional lines. From a
supply-side point of view, the influx of large blocks of institutional money may offer an
explanation of how capital gaps could exist in the midst of booming investment. With
these factors providing an industry context, I will now examine the survey results for
evidence on the issue of capital gaps.
CHAPTER V
THE SEARCH FOR CAPITAL GAPS:
EVIDENCE FROM A NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL SURVEY
The results of the national survey of venture capital firms I conducted in February
and March of 1998 give a more detailed picture of venture investment patterns and their
implications for regional economic development. In particular, they provide evidence
concerning the existence of capital gaps in the venture capital markets. Such gaps are of
great concern to regional and local officials. As mentioned in the introduction, two types
of capital gaps are possible. The first is a pure market, or private, gap. The second is a
development, or public, gap. Private gaps are essentially instances of market imperfection.
Such gaps indicate that, due to a particular structural characteristic of the venture capital
industry, capital is not uniformly flowing to the opportunities that provide the highest risk-
adjusted rates of return. As I discussed in Chapter IV, the supply-side attributes of the
venture capital industry offer a possible example of a distorting structural characteristic.
As large blocks of institutional capital become the dominant source of venture capital
funds, certain types of venture investments, such as early-stage and small investments, may
be drowned out.
Public gaps occur through the presence of externalities. These gaps occur when
the (generally social) benefits of a particular class or type of investment do not accrue to
the entity that bears the investment risk. Such benefits include job-creation, regional
factor enhancement, stimulation of long-term innovation, provision of entrepreneurial
opportunities to disadvantaged populations, and other positive economic developments
that are difficult for individual private actors to internalize. Indeed, the interaction
between venture capital and indigenous growth strategies provides a likely scenario for the
existence of a public capital gap. The creation and promotion of localization economies
by definition involves benefits that are external to individual companies. Because these
benefits are spread over a wide range of actors throughout an entire region or locality, a
venture investment that promotes industry clusters and diffused innovation (through
technological spillovers) may not capture the entirety of the regional economic
development benefits through its return. Thus venture capital firms may invest at lower-
than-desirable levels from a regional economic development standpoint. It should be
noted that public capital gaps, like private ones, depend upon the existence of viable
companies that have the capacity to earn returns for investors (I will refer to the existence
of such companies as "effective demand"). Public gaps exist when these returns are not
sufficient to induce a socially optimal amount of investment in particular opportunities
within a given region.
The survey results presented below allow us to hypothesize about the existence of
capital gaps and the likely contours of such gaps. By themselves, however, the data do
not distinguish between market and public capital gaps. As a result, I will employ the
general term "capital gap" to refer to the possibility that one or both of these types of gaps
is present. My point in discussing these two types of venture capital gaps is to depict a
plausible framework within with several types of underinvestment may take place.
Although in the absence of demand-side data on small firm capital needs and
rejection rates we cannot definitively prove the existence of capital gaps, we can analyze
whether the remaining survey data are consistent with the general presence of capital gaps.
We can also interpret what the survey data tell us about the likely characteristics of such
gaps. With the above caveats in mind, I will analyze the stage, size, industry, and regional
patterns contained in the closed-response portion of the survey. I will also present data on
the screening criteria that venture capitalists employ.
In the end, I find that venture capital gaps are most likely to occur by investment
stage and size. The survey results indicate that early-stage and small-size deals are more
likely to suffer from underinvestment. Some evidence also points to the presence of
industry and regional capital gaps. The results confirm the general pervasiveness of
regional capital leakage. To the extent that capital gaps exist by industry, they are most
likely to occur in traditional (non-high-tech) industries, consumer-oriented industries, or
industries with particularly long product-to-market time frames (biotechnology, for
example). Manufacturers, whose importance to regional economic development in terms
of exports was discussed in Chapter II, appear to capture a greater-than-proportional
share of venture financing. Finally, data on investment screening criteria emphasize the
importance of human capital to venture investment decisions. The absence of a factor
endowment such as management talent may provide an additional explanation for the
distribution of capital gaps. Before I turn to the presentation of survey data, I will
describe the survey's methodology.
Description of the Survey
The survey instrument is reproduced in Appendix A. To carry out the survey, I
took a systematic random sample of the venture capital firms listed in the 1997 Pratt's
Guide to Venture Capital Sources. I employed systematic methodology in order to assure
national geographic representation (the guide is organized by state). Out of the 1,244
venture capital organizations listed, I selected a sample of 139 venture capital firms. 24 I
contacted each firm by phone and attempted to arrange an interview to administer the
survey instrument. Overall, representatives of 35 venture firms responded to the survey,
yielding a response rate of 25%. I followed the administration of the survey questions
with an open-ended series of questions designed to elicit qualitative responses and
opinions. I oriented these latter questions toward the issue of capital gaps.
The survey poses questions concerning investment targeting, stage preferences,
investment size, industry preferences, and screening criteria. It also contains questions
regarding intraregional investment percentages, target return, and preferred exit time
frame. The survey treats the number of business plans received as a rough proxy for
demand. The survey also contains several specialized questions concerning manufacturing
as a proxy for the relationship among venture capital, the export base, and high wage jobs
(see Chapter II). In some instances survey questions ask for specific numbers and
percentages, while in others attitudinal ratings and rankings are sought.
24 Many of these firms are not classic early stage venture investors. The Pratt's Guide includes late stage
equity investment firms, as well as firms specializing in equity-related mezzanine-type investments. I
think that the inclusion of these latter types of firms is useful because it allows for a more accurate picture
of the distribution of equity investment funds.












The responding firms in the survey had an average of $86.3 million in capital
under management. This figure is comparable to the 1996 average of $88.4 million
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Region Percentage of $450 million. The geographic distribution of theFirms
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20%. The Southwest and Southeast accounted
for 9% and 6% of survey firms, respectively.
As with all surveys, bias is a concern. To the extent this survey is biased, it is
likely that the bias is in favor of small and geographically diverse venture capital firms.
Adjustments to reflect the composition of the parent population or the amount of capital
under management (as opposed to the number of firms) would require weighting the
responses of the western venture capitalists more heavily than their sample percentages. I
have chosen not to make such adjustments because I believe the distortions introduced
would outweigh the benefits.
26 Venture Economics, 1997 Annual Review, p. 3 of unbound copy.
Overview of Capital Gap Opinions
As mentioned above, the survey results provide evidence concerning the existence
of capital gaps. Overall, 63% (22 out of 35) of the interviewees felt that capital gaps exist
in the venture capital markets, despite the large influx of funds that has taken place over
27Table 7. Most Common Sources the past few years. Of the respondents who
of Capital Gap Attribution by
Respondents Believing In the
Existence of Gaps described such gaps in terms of investment
Investment Percentage of stage, investment size, industry, or region.
Characteristic Respondents
InvesmentStag 59%Many respondents pointed to more than one ofInvestment Stage 59%
Investment Size 45% these categories as sources of capital market
Industry 36%
Region 23% imperfections. The most commonly cited gap
Note: Percentages add to more than 100% was that of investment stage. As Table 7 shows,
because respondents cited multiple
characteristics. 59% of the interviewees who felt that gaps exist
beliveden:thAperhstecesorcaptal apsmos
believed that such gaps occur by stage, with
most asserting that early stage investments exhibit the greatest disjunction between
venture capital supply and demand.2 8 Forty-five percent of the capital gap believers
pointed to gaps for firms looking for small amounts of venture capital (generally under $1
million). Industry gaps and regional gaps were the other two major gap sources cited,
respectively drawing mention from 36% and 23% of those affirming the presence of
capital market imperfections. I will examine these most frequently cited sources of capital
gaps in turn. I will also discuss the screening criteria of the survey respondents and how
these criteria contribute (or do not contribute) to the problem of capital gaps.
27 The interviewees were asked about the presence of capital gaps and the nature of such gaps in the open-
ended portion of the survey. These responses were then coded and tabulated.
28 Demand here refers to effective demand. As noted earlier, the concept of a venture capital gap is
predicated on the idea that firms exist that could productively employ additional equity capital.
Investment Stage
The investment stage results support the contention that the focus of gravity in the
venture capital industry has shifted to later stage equity investments. In terms of firm
orientation, 52% of the survey
Figure 12. Stage Distribution of Survey firms stated that they primarily
Venture Capital Firms targeted late-stage equity
A1I Stage investments (Figure 12). By
contrast, a little less than a third
Late Stage
52% of the survey firms identified
themselves as early-stage (seed,
Early Stage
Source: Authors survey, 1998. 31 % startup, or first stage) investors.
Note: Percentages add to less than 100% due to rounding.
Seventeen percent were
diversified across stage categories. All survey firms were asked what percentage of their
investments were in early-stage deals (even venture firms that concentrate on later stages
may devote some portion of their portfolios to early stage investments). Collectively, only
37% of the investments made by survey firms were identified as early stage.
The attitudinal stage results also provide some confirmation of the assertion of a
late-stage preference, although the evidence is mixed. In this series of questions,
Table 8. Stage Preferences of interviewees were asked to rate
Respondents, 1-10 Scale
Stage Mean Rating Median Rating the desirability of investment by
Seed/Startup 4.68 5.00 stage on a scale of one to ten,
First Stage 5.53 6.00
Second Stage 5.47 5.00 with ten being the most
Mezzanine 5.26 5.00
Bridge 4.41 4.00
Acquisition 6.06 6.50 defined as the interviewee's
Mgmt./LBO 6.56 7.00
Note: Mgmt./LBO = management or leveraged buyout. assessment of the attractiveness
Source: Authors survey, 1998. of the rate of return available in
the current market, taking both growth potential and deal pricing into account.
Respondents were asked for their personal opinions of all investment stage categories,
regardless of whether their individual firms invested in particular stages. The idea behind
seeking such opinions is that venture capitalists deploy their capital along a continuum of
investment stages and periodically evaluate the relative attractiveness of different types of
equity investments. The mean responses, as shown in Table 8, reveal a preference for
acquisition and leveraged buyout (LBO) deals. These two "late" stages, with respective
mean ratings of 6.06 and 6.56, garnered the highest average ratings of all equity
investment stages. The median ratings for these two categories are also the highest out of
all the stages. The picture for the remaining categories is somewhat more complicated.
Although seed and startup deals had the second most unattractive mean rating, in median
terms these deals were on a par with second stage and mezzanine deals. Bridge
financing-perhaps suffering from unattractive pricing due to intense competition-
received the lowest mean and median ratings of the group. First stage deals received a
high median rating (6.00), but wide variation among their low ratings pulled their average
down into a range comparable to second stage and mezzanine deals. In general, the earlier
stages showed greater dispersion of ratings, with more extreme scores on the low end of
the rating scale. The results thus provide mixed support for the late stage hypothesis.
Although the differences between some of the "middle" stages were not pronounced,
other aspects of the data, particularly the highly positive outlook on acquisition and LBO
deals, are consistent with the picture of a shift towards later stage investing. Such a shift
could imply either a market capital gap for early stage firms or an allocation of capital
away from truly unattractive returns.
Another indicator of stage preferences-albeit an imperfect one-is preferred size
of investment recipient. In this series of questions, respondents were asked to rate on a
scale of one to ten the
Table 9. Preferred Revenue Size in
Recipient Companies, 1-10 Scale desirability (based on rate of
Sales Mean Rating Median Rating
< $500,000 3.82 3.00
$500,000-$1 million 4.30 5.00
$1-$5 million 5.30 5.00
$5-$50 million 6.76 7.00 of existing revenues. As with
> $50 million 5.00 4.00
Source: Authors survey, 1998. the stage preferences (and all
subsequent questions of this
variety), one is the least attractive and ten is the most attractive rating. The results
indicate that perceived attractiveness of investment rises steadily with the level of sales
(Table 9). The mean ratings begin at a lowly 3.82 for companies with less than $500,000
in annual revenues and work their way up to 5.3 for companies with sales between $1
million and $5 million. This trend reverses itself, however, at sales levels above $50
million. At this point the average rating falls to 5.0 from its high of 6.76 in the $5-50
million category, possibly reflecting expensive pricing and intense competition. The
median figures confirm this general pattern. The revenue-size results thus complement the
stage preference ratings. Just as with seed/startup stage investments, survey venture
capitalists held pessimistic views concerning the relative attractiveness of investments in
(generally small) firms with very low current revenues.
Investment Size
One frequently heard comment is that "it's very hard to get under $1 million" in
29
venture financing. Indeed, 86% of the venture firms in the survey have minimum
investment levels for their initial participation in a deal. The mean minimum investment
Table 10. Threshold Distribution size was $1.02 million across all firms surveyed.
Of Initial Investment Sizes for This figure compares with a mean average
Survey Venture Capital Firms
Investment Size Mean Percentage investment size of $2.58 million. The
< $5 million 86% percentage distribution of the initial investments
< $1 million 28%
< $500,000 8% of the venture firms in the survey is contained in
Source: Authors Survey, 1998. Table 10.30 Initial investments should not be
confused with the total amount of money that a venture firm anticipates investing in a
company before exiting the financial relationship. In this context, initial investments refer
to the first-round disbursements of venture capitalists to the recipient companies. The
distribution of these initial investments below certain thresholds gives an indication of how
venture capital is deployed. The majority of initial investments are in the $1 million to $5
million range. Eighty-six percent fall below $5 million. A sharp drop occurs in the
number of investments below the $1 million threshold. About 28% of initial investments
fall in this category. Finally, only 8% of the initial investments made by survey venture
29 March 4, 1998 interview with general partner in New York-based venture capital firm.
30 The table refers to distribution by number of investments, not by dollar amount.
capital firms are in amounts below $500,000. This orientation toward larger investment
sizes would likely become even more pronounced if the analysis were carried out by
percentage of investment dollar amounts or by amount of funds invested over the life of a
company (as opposed to number of investments). Nevertheless, these percentages show
that among the survey firms, venture capital tends to be disbursed in large chunks as
opposed to small pieces.
Industry Patterns
Analysis of the industry preferences of survey respondents adds depth to the
industry concentration analysis from Chapter IV. The detailed industry results conform in
many ways to expected patterns. Interviewees were asked to rate their view of the
desirability (based on rate of return) of investment in a series of industries on a scale of
one to ten. Table 11 contains the mean results. In general, high-tech industries such as
Table 11. Detailed Industry Preferences of Respondents,
1-10 Scale
Industry Mean Rating Median Rating
Telecommunications 7.31 8.00
Software 6.54 7.00
Other Medical 6.11 7.00
Medical Devices 6.03 6.00
Industrial Electronics 5.51 6.00
Other Computer 5.29 6.00
Biotechnology 4.14 4.00
Computer Hardware 4.11 4.00
Energy 3.60 3.00
Transportation 3.51 3.00
Consumer Electronics 3.43 3.00
Retail 3.06 2.00
Source: Author's survey, 1998.
telecommunications, software, and medical devices received the highest ratings, with mean
scores ranging from 6.03 (medical devices) to 7.31 (telecommunications). Industries not
falling under the high-tech classification, such as energy, transportation, and retail, drew
notably lower ratings. Mean responses for this group ranged from 3.06 (retail) to 3.60
(energy). Consistent with the theories of localization economies, technological rents, and
the importance of innovation, the commodity manufacturing category of consumer
electronics received a low rating of 3.43. Likewise, as expected from the discussion in
Chapter IV, computer hardware garnered a low mean score of 4.11. The median
responses largely mirror the mean results. Telecommunications and software lead the
pack with median scores of 8.00 and 7.00, respectively. Retail, energy, and consumer
electronics bring up the bottom with median ratings of 2.00, 3.00, and 3.00.
The one industry that defied the general trend was biotechnology. Despite the
industry's high-tech status, survey respondents felt that biotech was an unattractive
investment, as indicated by its average score of 4.14 (median = 4.00). The most common
reason given for this low rating was the extremely long time frame before products could
be brought to market (often eight to ten years). This long time period stands in clear
contrast to the survey respondents' mean desired exit period of 5.4 years. These overall
industry results have implications for the issue of capital gaps. If gaps exist by industry,
from a supply-side perspective (based on this attitudinal data) these gaps are most likely to
occur in traditional "low-tech" industries or in industries that require extremely patient
capital. Of course, if demand were particularly strong, such gaps could also occur in the
highly rated software and telecommunications industries.
Another way of exploring the industry preference issue is through the
manufacturing/services distinction. From an economic development perspective, the issue
of the attitudes of venture capitalists toward manufacturing is of particular concern.
Because of manufacturing's high wages and export levels, investment shifts in the
manufacturing sector can have profound consequences for regional economic
development. Employing the same methodology outlined above, the survey asked
respondents for their opinions of the desirability of investments in a more aggregated set
of industry categories based on the division between manufacturing and services. As
Table 12 demonstrates, interviewees rated high-tech and business services as the most
Table 12. Aggregate Industry Preferences of Respondents,
1-10 Scale
Industry Mean Rating Median Rating
High-Tech Services 6.31 7.00
Industrial/Business Services 6.09 6.00
High-Tech Manufacturing 5.69 6.00
Industrial Product Manufacturing 5.51 6.00
Consumer Services 4.94 5.00
Consumer Product Manufacturing 4.14 3.00
Source: Author's survey, 1998.
desirable broad industry categories. High-tech and industrial product manufacturing came
next, with consumer services and consumer product manufacturing garnering the least
desirable ratings. As the median ratings show, the differences between the top service and
manufacturing categories are not pronounced enough to draw any hard and fast
conclusions. Business services, high-tech manufacturing, and industrial product
manufacturing all have median responses of 6.00. In general, the results do not provide
much evidence of a strong bias against manufacturing or in favor of services. These
results do, however, indicate a preference for industrial products and services, as opposed
to consumer products or services. This outcome may stem from negative feelings about
the commodity nature of consumer products and the low export potential of consumer
services.
One final piece of evidence concerning manufacturing comes from a set of survey
questions that focus on the distribution of business plans received and investments made
by the survey venture capital firms. In order to obtain venture financing, companies must
first submit business plans to the venture capital firms. These business plans thus serve as
a broad indication of the level and type of demand for venture financing. The survey
evidence, which is presented in Table 13, indicates that manufacturers' share of venture
investment deals (48%) is roughly proportional to their share of submitted business plans
(44%). From the point of view of survey respondents, supply is proportional to demand
at this aggregate level. The data do reveal a couple of interesting aspects of venture
Table 13. Distribution of Business Plans
And Investments by Sector and Technology
Percentage of business plans from manufacturers: 44%
Percentage of manufacturing business plans that are high-tech: 55%
Percentage of recipient companies that are manufacturers: 48%
Percentage of recipient manufacturers that are high-tech: 55%
Note: Respondents were told not to include software companies as manufacturers
in the above questions.
Source: Author's survey, 1998.
investing and manufacturing, however. First, manufacturers receive a greater share of
venture financing than their share of the economy. In total, 48% of businesses receiving
venture financing from survey firms are manufacturers (not including software
companies). This percentage is substantially larger than manufacturers' share of total
employment (19%), establishments (6%), or output (20% of private industry GDP).3 1 The
second interesting aspect of these results is the fact that the interviewees reported that
only 55% of the manufacturers that submit business plans and that receive venture
financing are in high-tech industries. This somewhat surprising outcome could reflect the
high proportion of later stage firms in the sample. These firms tend to prefer investments
in more mature industries with proven technologies, including (generally large-scale)
traditional manufacturing enterprises.
Regional Patterns
As pointed out earlier, venture capital markets are both fluid and regional in
nature. On the one hand, venture firms have always exported significant amounts of
capital outside of their home regions in order to take advantage of productive
opportunities. On the other hand, information asymmetries inherent in the financing of
unproven technology and high-risk growth strategies place a premium on local knowledge
and limit the degree to which venture capital can approach the undifferentiated status of
debt capital. These issues are crucial to planners and business officials seeking to plug
regional capital gaps and promote economic development through stimulation of the
31 The employment and establishment percentages were calculated from 1995 aggregate County Business
Patterns data, U.S. Census Bureau. The GDP percentage was calculated from 1996 Bureau of Economic
Analysis data.
regional (or local) venture capital industry. It is important to recognize that not all
venture capital is invested locally or regionally. The survey provides some evidence on
these matters. As Table 14 demonstrates, the capital "leakage" rate can be substantial.
Table 14. Regional Venture Investment Patterns
Percentage of business plans received from within same region: 53%
Percentage of investments made within the same region: 55%
Percentage of investments made within the same metropolitan area: 24%
Note: Regions were defined as Northeast, Midwest, Southeast, Southwest, and West.
Source: Author's survey, 1998.
On average, venture capital firms in the survey made 55% of their investments within the
same broad geographic region (Northeast, Midwest, Southeast, Southwest, West) in
which they were located. This percentage is proportional to the share of business plans
received from companies located in the same region as the venture firm (53%). For cities
and metropolitan areas, the capital leakage rate is much higher. Overall, survey venture
firms made 76% of their investments outside the greater metropolitan area in which they
were located. From a national perspective, these results imply that the presence of four
dollars of local venture capital results in about one dollar of local venture investment. Of
course, as I discussed in Chapter IV, these import-export ratios vary greatly from region
to region. Nevertheless, the above percentages indicate that solving the problem of
regional and local capital gaps may require other actions (increased investment in R&D,
etc.) that improve the effective demand-and thus the "capture" rate-of the target region
or locality.
Screening
The screening procedures and criteria of venture capitalists constitute another
source of information about venture capital investment patterns. The portions of the
survey that deal with screening shed light on the relative importance of various factors in
the investment decision-making process. These results have implications for our inquiry
into the possible contours of capital gaps because they provide evidence about what types
of firms-and how many firms-are likely to secure venture financing.
On average, firms in the survey received 455 business plans seeking venture
financing during the course of 1997 (Table 15). Of this amount, the average survey firm
seriously reviewed 47 business plans, or roughly 10% of those submitted. 2 Out of the
population of serious candidates, survey venture firms invested in an average of five new
companies in 1997." In addition to new financings, survey firms undertook a mean of
Table 15. Survey Venture Investment Demand
and Supply, 1997
Mean Median
Business plans received: 454.8 350
Business plans seriously reviewed: 46.5 28
New financings: 4.9 5
Total financings (new financings plus follow-ons) 9.5 9
Note: Serious review is defined as ten hours or more of due diligence.
Source: Authors survey, 1998.
five follow-on financings for existing portfolio companies (for a per-firm total of 10
financings in 1997). Ultimately, just over 1% of those businesses seeking venture capital
succeeded in securing financing.3 4 These numbers reveal the highly selective nature of the
venture capital industry.
The decision-making process by which venture capital firms weed out applicant
businesses involves a number of factors. The most important of these is expected rate of
return. The venture firms in the survey had a mean annualized target internal rate of
return (IRR) of 31%. The median target return was 30%. These figures represent the
return that venture capital firms seek across an entire fund. In order to achieve such a
return, the annualized hurdle rates for individual deals must often exceed 50%. Among
survey firms, the mean target time period for realizing these gains was five years (the
median was also five years). Clearly there are likely to be many profitable and potentially
profitable companies who do not meet these explosive growth criteria. One important
32 Serious review was defined as ten hours or more of due diligence.
33 By new I mean new to the venture capital firm, not new as in startup.
34 It should be noted that the percentage of successful applicants may be somewhat higher due to the
submission of the same business plan to different venture capital firms. However, in general businesses
seeking venture investments target their submissions to avoid the negative reputation that accompanies
question for future research on capital gaps is whether businesses with lower growth
trajectories can be profitably served by a diversified venture capital industry, or whether
such businesses are fundamentally unsuitable for venture financing.
An additional screening issue involves the identity of the individual who conducts
the initial weeding-out process for submitted business plans. As with the banking industry,
it is sometimes hypothesized that the biases of
Table 16. Responsibility for Initial less experienced, junior employees can result
Screening Among Survey Firms
Partner/Fund Executive 51% in the elimination of otherwise deserving
Analyst/Other Employee 23%
Both 26% applicants for venture financing. The survey
Source: Authors survey, 1998. results, however, provide evidence that in the
venture capital industry it is general partners or fund executives who carry out the bulk of
initial screening. In 51% of the survey firms, general partners or fund executives make the
initial determination of a business plan's prospects (Table 16). Analysts or other junior
employees are responsible for this early filtering in only 23% of the survey venture firms.
In the remaining 26% a mixture of the two groups performs these duties. Thus, although
the investment screening process may contain significant biases, it is the attitudes of
partners, not junior employees, that should be the focus of investigation.
In order to develop a picture of the attitudinal orientation of institutional venture
capitalists, survey respondents were asked to rank five investment-screening criteria from
most important (1) to least important (5). The results reveal some interesting aspects of
the way in which venture capitalists evaluate deals (Table 17). The consensus choice for
the most important factor in assessing the attractiveness of a deal was management
experience. With an average rating of 1.51 and a median rating of 1.00, the quality of
management stood out as the paramount concern of venture capitalists. As one
Cleveland-based survey respondent stated, "If you could hand me six good CEO's, I could
find them opportunities [to start new companies]."3" This result indicates that, despite the
overwhelming emphasis on technology and R&D investment in venture-oriented growth
business plans that are "shopped around" too much. The point thus remains that successful venture
applicants are a very small percentage of the total pool of applicants.
3 February 27, 1998 interview.
strategies, the development of local management talent may be just as critical to fostering
a dense network of venture-funded high-growth companies.
The remaining screening criteria are grouped fairly closely. Following
management experience, survey respondents rated industry sector and proprietary
technology as the next most
Table 17. Investment Screening Criteria, Ranked important screening criteria. BothFrom Most Important (1) to Least Important (5)
Mean Median had median ratings of 3.00. The
Management Experience 1.51 1.00 emphasis on these two categories isIndustry Sector 3.06 3.00
Proprietary Technology 3.29 3.00 in keeping with the heavy
Market Size 3.29 4.00
Marketing Strategy 3.86 4.00 concentration of venture capital
Source: Author's survey, 1998. within particular industries
(Chapter IV), as well as the importance of technological rents to innovation-based high-
growth strategies (Chapter II). Market size and marketing strategy, with median scores of
4.00, were the lowest rated screening criteria. In general, survey respondents felt that,
given the right management team and an attractive technology, they could use their
influence to redirect marketing strategy and employ their contacts to increase the market
size. With regard to capital gaps, these attitudinal data indicate that such gaps would be
most likely to involve unproven management teams and firms in more traditional industries
whose product or process innovations are not proprietary.
Summary of Results
These results indicate that venture capital gaps are most likely to exist by
investment stage and size. The survey data are consistent with a picture of gaps for early-
stage firms and those seeking small amounts (generally under $1 million) of venture
capital. These findings are consistent with the supply-side/institutional investor hypothesis
laid out in Chapter IV. The survey confirms the concentration of venture capital in
particular high-tech industries, but it does not provide evidence for the existence of capital
gaps in the crucial export-oriented manufacturing sector. In fact, manufacturers-even
non-high-tech manufacturers-appear to receive a greater-than-proportional share of
venture investments. To the extent that industry capital gaps exist, they are most likely to
occur in industries requiring very patient capital (biotech) or in consumer-oriented or
other non-high-tech industries. It should be noted that the latter two industry types are
not integral to the innovation-based localization economies that provide the strongest
rationale for venture capital-oriented indigenous growth strategies. The biotech gap, on
the other hand, should be a matter of concern to policymakers in high factor-cost regions
who are seeking to promote innovation-based localization economies. Regional capital
gaps are also quite likely to exist, although the size of the data cells in this survey is too
small to permit disaggregated regional comparisons. It is nevertheless clear that
significant regional and local leakage occurs. Such leakage indicates the importance of
building regional infrastructure and effective demand. Finally, from a screening
perspective, management capacity is vital to the success of firms seeking venture
financing. Human management capital may be just as important in the formation of
effective demand as a technology base.
CHAPTER VI.
CONCLUSION
I have undertaken two strands of analysis in this thesis. First, I have described the
reasons why planners, policymakers, and business leaders should care about venture
capital and its role in regional economic development. Second, I have investigated the
question of whether impediments to regional economic development-capital gaps-are
likely to exist in the venture capital industry. In order to explore these two issues, I laid
out the theoretical underpinnings of venture-led indigenous growth strategies; discussed
the relationship between the argument for such strategies and small-firm employment
arguments; depicted the institutional boundaries of the venture capital industry as it
pertains to regional economic development; and described the likely characteristics of
capital gaps through analysis of survey data.
Those who are concerned with regional economic development should care about
venture capital because it is a critical component of the indigenous growth strategies
towards which many regions-particularly high factor-cost regions-are turning.
Although regional economic theorists have minimized or omitted discussion of venture
capital in the past, venture capital has a strong connection to both industry cluster theories
and product/profit life cycle theories. It is a specialized factor of production that enables
the development of the concentrated innovation-based localization economies that form
the core of indigenous growth strategies. Venture capital is particularly important for high
factor-cost regions that seek to capitalize on the temporary monopolies associated with
the early stages of the product/profit life cycle. The increased levels of innovation,
technological rents, and exports associated with venture-backed firms attest to the
significance of venture capital for regional economic development and provide a
justification for further examination of the industry and its characteristics.
Venture capital's relevance to regional economic development is not dependent on
small-firm arguments. Although venture capital-oriented development strategies inevitably
involve small firms, it is the innovative character and reliance upon external economies of
these firms that provides a rationale for venture capital, not the continued small size of
such firms.
Despite the critical role of venture capital, a number of industry characteristics
place bounds on its impact on regional economic development. Venture capital is a small
portion of total investment that is highly concentrated in the computer and life science
industries. Levels of venture financing appear to respond to both specific technological
demand and macroeconomic conditions. The macroeconomic responses of the venture
capital industry may, in certain circumstances, provide opportunities for non-high-tech and
other industries to increase their share of venture financing, but these responses have a
down side as well. In particular, the data show that the industry is heavily procyclical.
Planners and policymakers should take note of the fact that venture capital investments
have not counteracted economic downturns in the past. The export of venture capital
outside of the region or locality in which a venture capital firm is located places a further
restraint on the impact of venture capital on local investment. Finally, the increasing
importance of pension funds in the supply of venture capital and the large venture funds
that result from these capital inflows provide a plausible explanation for the existence of
capital gaps in the face of the tremendous expansion of the venture capital industry.
Although we cannot definitively determine whether observed capital gaps are
public or private in nature, we can see from the survey results that the characteristics of
the venture capital industry are consistent with the general presence of both of these types
of capital gaps. The results indicate that such gaps are most likely to exist by stage and
size. Early-stage and small-size deals may suffer from underinvestment. Regional and
industry gaps are also probable. Differing regional capital leakage rates open up the
possibility that gaps may exist in the presence of a substantial number of local venture
capital funds. Industry gaps do not appear to exist for the manufacturing sector as a
whole, but they are somewhat more likely in consumer-oriented industries, traditional non-
high-tech industries, and industries requiring extremely patient capital.
The above-described conclusions concerning the venture capital industry have
several implications for regional economic development strategies. First, if policymakers
wish to address capital gaps by investment stage and size, they must recognize that the
institutional form of the policy intervention matters. Only the creation and promotion of
small venture funds can remedy investment stage and investment size capital gaps. The
critical issue is not the total amount of capital available, but the size of the institutions that
supply and invest venture funds. Regardless of whether regions form new funds or
provide incentives to existing private-sector funds, only small funds will make small
investments and seek out the non-standardized early stage investments that are inimical to
large-scale venture investors. Such small-scale venture investments are one way in which
high factor-cost regions can promote the innovation-based localization economies that are
central to regional economic development.
A second policy implication is that, despite the limitations of venture capital as a
policy instrument, the presence of a vibrant local or regional venture capital industry is
very desirable. Although on average 45% of venture capital leaks outside the region in
which a venture capital firm is located, and 76% leaks outside the home-base metropolitan
area (see Chapter V), the residual venture investments that are captured by a region or
locality are important. It is certainly true that regions must first assure through
infrastructure investments-scientific research, human capital training, specialized
technical assistance-that area firms constitute an effective demand for venture capital,
but once these basic infrastructure and demand conditions are met, the presence of a
substantial local or regional venture capital industry is likely to result in higher capture
rates for innovative new firm growth.
Finally, the introduction of public sector capital to the venture capital industry
during economic downturns might have the effect of smoothing the industry's procyclical
behavior. The public sector, by providing a countercyclical source of investment, might be
able to encourage existing venture capital firms to act on the otherwise attractive front-
end pricing incentives that exist during recessions. By increasing investment at the bottom
of the economic cycle, regions may bring about quicker economic recoveries. Such
countercyclical public venture capital investments may have additional benefits. First, due
to the longer time frames that downcycle investing inevitably involves, these investments
may be able to go some way towards filling the capital gap for industries requiring
extremely patient capital (i.e. biotechnology). Second, such investments may stimulate
healthier economic recoveries by increasing the proportion of indigenous growth
opportunities in the post-recession regional economy. Countercyclical public sector
venture investments thus may help ensure that the economic restructuring that often
accompanies recessions and recoveries does not take a particularly undesirable form from
a regional perspective. Through such venture investments, high factor-cost regions can
focus their efforts on reinvigorating their innovation-based localization economies, thus
providing themselves with some insulation from the ill effects of industry maturation and
the geographic dispersion of production.
APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Survey Method
The survey instrument is reproduced in Appendix A. To carry out the survey, I
took a systematic random sample of the venture capital firms listed in the 1997 Pratt's
Guide to Venture Capital Sources. I employed systematic methodology in order to assure
national geographic representation (the guide is organized by state). Out of the 1,244
venture capital organizations listed, I selected a sample of 139 venture capital firms. I
contacted each firm by phone and attempted to arrange an interview to administer the
survey instrument. Overall, representatives of 35 venture firms responded to the survey,
yielding a response rate of 25%. I followed the administration of the survey questions
with an open-ended series of questions designed to elicit qualitative responses and
opinions. I oriented these latter questions toward the issue of capital gaps.
The survey poses questions concerning investment targeting, stage preferences,
investment size, industry preferences, and screening criteria. It also contains questions
regarding intraregional investment percentages, target return, and preferred exit time
frame. The survey treats the number of business plans received as a rough proxy for
demand. The survey also contains several specialized questions concerning manufacturing
as a proxy for the relationship among venture capital, the export base, and high wage jobs.
In some instances survey questions ask for specific numbers and percentages, while in






1.) How much (venture) capital does your fund have under management?
2.) Does your fund target its investments (by industry, geography, etc.)?
What type of targeting? Industry (which ones?):
Geography (where?):
Other:
3.) Are there industries that you will not consider investing in?
4.) On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the most desirable, what is your view of the
desirability (based on rate of return) of the following investment stages?
Seed/Startup (product development)
1st stage (initiating full-scale operations, scaling up services/production)
2nd stage (initial expansion)
3rd/Mezz. (existing firm expansion)
Bridge (shortly before going public)
Acquisition
Mgmt./LBO
5.) What percentage of the investments your fund makes are early stage (seed/startup or
1st stage)?
6.) Of the stages mentioned above, are there particular ones you target?
Which stages?
7.) What is your fund's target return?
8.) Over what time period?
9.) How many business plans seeking venture financing did your fund receive last year?
10.) How many of these did your fund seriously review (at least 10 hours)?
11.) How many different companies did you actually make venture investments in?
12.) How many individual financings did you make?
13.) What is the average size of venture investment your fund makes?
14.) Do you have a minimum investment size?
What size?
15.) What percentage of your investments are under $5 million?
What percentage of your investments are under $1 million?
What percentage of your investments are under $500,000?
16.) On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the most desirable, what is your view of the desirability






17.) What percentage of the business plans you receive are from companies that manufacture
a product?
What percentage of these manufacturers are in high-tech industries?
18.) What percentage of the companies that you finance manufacture products?
What percentage of these manufacturers are in high-tech industries?
19.) What percentage of the business plans you receive are from firms located within the same
region (region=NE,SE, MW,SW, or West) that your company is located in?
20.) What percentage of the firms you have made investments in are located in the same
region (region=NE,SE,MW,SW, or West) that your company is located in?
21.) What percentage of the firms you have made investments in are located in the same
metropolitan area (city) that your company is located in?





















24.) Who performs the initial screening of business plans (gen. ptnr. or analyst)?
25.) Please rank the following five investment screening criteria from most important to least
important in terms of your decision-making process (please assign the number 1 to the






26.) Finally, what do you see as the key trends in venture capital investing?
Do you perceive capital gaps in the venture capital markets?
If so, what form do these gaps take?
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